

## A Silver Lining to Covid-19: Localising Supermarket Value Chains



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# Editor's Note



Welcome to the Re-branded ZIPAR Newsletter! The Newsletter which in previous years was issued Quarterly will henceforth be published bi-annually. This edition covers commentaries and events that took place between January to June 2020. As you all know, so far, the year 2020 has been exceptional due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The highly contagious new coronavirus is spreading globally at a very rapid pace, and in Zambia having infected about 10,218 people and killed nearly 269 as at 19th August 2020. The pandemic has imposed unprecedented socioeconomic disruptions including restrictions on international movements, meetings and partial lockdowns, restrictions requiring people to work-from-home, job losses and business closures, and several other challenges in the policy systems.

While COVID-19 has brought several challenges, it also presents numerous opportunities to step up the role of various actors and players in the local economy. For example, the Minister of Finance recently identified the outstanding opportunity for greater local supplier participation in supermarket value chains as one of the measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on Zambia's economy. We totally agree with the Minister on this one as we too see a silver lining to the dark cloud brought about by COVID-19, hence our cover story is titled; A Silver Lining to Covid-19:

Localising Supermarket Value Chains. ZIPAR had already raised a number of issues on this very subject in our 2017 study titled; 'The Expansion of Regional Supermarket Chains: Implications for Local Suppliers in Zambia'. Our article largely draws from the evidence gathered during the study and it is our hope that the Government could consider our policy recommendations particularly now that the pandemic has presented the authorities the opportunity to support local firms build supplier capabilities that can gradually start to displace imports. We hope you will enjoy reading this story and many other COVID-19 related articles we feature in this edition.

**Euphrasia Mapulanga Ilunga**



# A Silver Lining to Covid-19: Localising Supermarket Value Chains



Mwanda Phiri




Claudia Pollen

The main narrative surrounding the economic impact of Covid-19 has been negative given the projected cost to the global economy. At best, the IMF projects a 3 percent contraction in global output, WTO a 13 percent decline in global trade, and ILO a loss in working hours equivalent to 195 million full-time jobs.

At home, the IMF's projected cost to Zambia's economy is even greater – a contraction in economic output of 3.5 percent is anticipated which entails an economic recession. Notwithstanding this dire situation, a positive narrative to Covid-19 is emerging that could just be a silver lining to this dark cloud, particularly for local suppliers in Zambia that previously had difficulty accessing supermarkets. This opportunity largely emanates from disruptions to the usual global and regional supply chains as countries cut back on production and exports of goods due to lockdowns, social distancing, travel bans and tighter border controls. Inadvertently, this is providing Zambian firms some degree of artificial temporary protection from import competition which could potentially open up greater domestic market access.

The Finance Minister's recent statement on further measures to mitigate the impact of Covid-19 on Zambia's economy identifies this outstanding opportunity for greater local supplier participation in supermarket value chains and import substitution. Consequently, a Taskforce has been established by the Government to ensure that more Zambian products are stocked on the shelves of supermarkets.

We consider the emphasis on increasing local content to be a positive development particularly if the necessary conditions for market access such as quality and quantity are met by local suppliers. Hence, the private sector should aggressively seize this opportunity and Government should support local firms build supplier capabilities that can gradually start to displace imports. A number of issues raised on this very subject in ZIPAR's 2017 study titled 'The Expansion of Regional



Supermarket Chains: Implications for Local Suppliers in Zambia' may require consideration. ZIPAR argues that the coming of foreign supermarket chain stores provides more than just a convenient one-stop-shop for bread, butter and other household consumables. A broader opportunity exists for stimulating increased agro-production, manufacturing, product upgrading and indirect employment creation through the integration of local suppliers in supermarket value chains.

Although some level of local participation in supermarket chains has been evident over the years, we found barriers to entry that have limited full and effective participation of local suppliers and the potential for industrial growth and job creation. We isolated the following issues albeit not exhaustively, that were found to be prohibitive factors for local firms not supplying supermarkets and to a lesser extent, firms supplying supermarkets. These include: the payment period for goods supplied purported to be protracted; weak supplier capabilities exacerbated by the lack of affordable finance to upgrade production; import competition; and supermarkets' buyer power. While all these issues require equal consideration, we dwell on delayed payments because quick wins can be gained here.

Within the private sector, little attention has been devoted to supplier payment terms imposed by supermarkets and other private businesses that could be posing liquidity and growth constraints particularly for MSMEs. ZIPAR found that local suppliers are often subjected to long payment terms at best 30 days after invoicing, and



at worst up to 90 days. This not only affects the ability of local firms to effectively and reliably supply supermarkets, but also constrains their growth prospects and ability to venture into other value adding activities and thus compete favourably with similar products from the region.

The logic is simple. To sustain operational activities required to participate in supermarket value chains, firms require working capital to invest back into the business, acquire inventory and ensure continuous supply of goods and services. Additionally, for local firms to grow, particularly small businesses with limited affordable financing options, the majority of firms have to finance investments using internally generated revenues and/or equity. As such, supermarkets' payment terms with local suppliers may have immeasurable effects on the potential for micro and small enterprises to expand their activities, absorb more labour and upgrade their production processes.

So how do we ease this cash flow problem that is likely to be exacerbated by Covid-19 and ensure effective participation of local suppliers in supermarket and other value chains? Well, we could enact late payment legislation. In 1998, the UK prescribed legal measures aimed at combating late payment in business to business transactions which later extended to the EU. Essentially, buyers are required to pay for goods and services within 60 days at most unless otherwise explicitly agreed, and to pay interest on late payments.

Alternatively, to preserve good

supplier-buyer relations between supermarkets and local suppliers, we could encourage a voluntary 'prompt payment code' that promotes fair and transparent contractual terms and curtails abuse of bargaining power. But for local suppliers that still need to borrow to bridge the working capital financing gap, the Bank of Zambia K10 billion Targeted Medium-Term Refinancing Facility should be leveraged for a dedicated and more affordable Supplier Credit Line. This amongst other key issues aforementioned require consideration. And plausibly, further empirical research on for instance, the total number and spread of local suppliers in Zambia and their capacity constraints.



# Keeping Children in Schools Fed



By Miselo Bwalya



The Covid-19 pandemic has undoubtedly disrupted learning among other effects. On 17th March 2020, the Government announced, among other Covid-19 measures, the indefinite closure of all schools in a bid to curb the spread of the virus. In response, some private schools, especially in urban areas started providing online lessons to fill the learning gaps left. On 8th May 2020, the President announced some measures to relax restrictions and to resume school for examination classes on 1st of June 2020. The pronouncement was made following a period of relatively low confirmed cases and high recovery rates, around 66 percent and almost twice the global recovery rate of 34 percent. While examination classes resumed, it still remains unclear as to when non-examination classes will resume.

The indefinite closure of schools has not only disrupted learning but has also left over one million children who would usually benefit from Zambia's School Feeding Programme (SFP) at risk of hunger. The SFP was initiated in Zambia in 2003 by the World Food Programme (WFP) following the 2002 food crisis brought by the drought spell around the same time. It aimed to improve school attendance and enrolment using meals to attract students from vulnerable homes. The programme also

aimed to improve the nutritional status of the children as well as their cognitive and academic performance.

The programme guarantees vulnerable children in participating schools one high-energy, protein-rich cooked meal a day. The meal which is given to children in all grades during the school days comprises mainly of maize and beans. The meals contribute greatly to the nutritional status of school children from poor households that already face the risk of

food insecurity. However, SFP is a school based programme and it cannot be provided if children are not in school as is the case now for those in non-examination classes.

The programme initially targeted community schools and was later extended to public schools in collaboration with the Government. Currently, the SFP is being implemented in 39 districts in all ten provinces, covering over 2,600 schools in both rural and urban areas. Participating schools are selected based on existing poverty levels in the area as well as school enrolment, attendance and dropout rates.

There is strong evidence that the programme has been effective in achieving its aims. A 2018 evaluation of the SFP by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) revealed that the provision of meals had a positive impact on the schooling outcomes such as increased pass grade, increased attendance



and reduced dropout rates. As further evidence, WFP estimates that countries stand to gain a US\$10 US dollar return for every US\$1 US dollar invested in school meals measured by improvements in education, health and productivity gains.

It is expected that the socio-economic effects of the COVID 19 pandemic will worsen the poverty situation of already vulnerable households. The impact will be compounded for several households that were already at risk of food insecurity pre-COVID-19. The 2019 In-Depth Vulnerability and Needs Assessment Report estimated that between October 2019 and March 2020, 2.3 million Zambians would face a food security crisis.

Since the first COVID-19 cases were reported, Zambia has continued to record high recovery rates implying that the health-related impacts will not be as high as initially anticipated. However, the continued rise in the number of new cases and mortalities makes it unclear as to when the non-examination classes could resume. The longer non-examination classes stay away from school, the higher the risk of hunger among the vulnerable school children and consequently, the elevated risk of malnutrition and suppression of their learning capabilities.

The resumption of examination classes provides an opportunity to also resume the SFP for non-examination classes. For non-examination classes,

the Government must put in place measures to ensure that vulnerable children continue to receive these meals. This should be done by allowing children to collect meals from schools. Collection times could be staggered so as to limit the numbers of children attended to at any given time. This approach has been used in other countries such as Nigeria where the SFP continued despite the closure of schools. Additionally, the provision of hand washing facilities must be enhanced as this is a key preventive measure for COVID-19. However, caution should be exercised for schools in the Covid-19 epicentres and it may be necessary to exempt those.



*Claudia Pollen*

## Innovative COVID-19 Response Options for Civil Society

**C**COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by corona virus, has become the most significant national and global preoccupation for just about everyone in 2020. The pandemic has imposed unprecedented socioeconomic disruptions ranging from business closures to restrictions requiring people to work-from-home, job losses and the new phenomenon called social distancing.



*Caesar Cheelo*

Governments across the world are strained beyond imagination; hence an opportunity exists for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to complement public sector COVID-19 responses. A holistic and inclusive response will require putting aside political differences, fostering more coordinated global leadership, and mobilizing more resources and using them rationally. It will also require a considered recognition that

government responses will almost naturally have gaps, which present opportunities for CSOs to vie for all-weather and effective collaborative partnerships towards closing any such gaps.

Since Zambia recorded its first case in March 2020, COVID-19 cases had been on an upward trajectory with the rate of fatalities steadily rising. High density urban localities with widespread informal settlements



FILE: CSO representatives during a ZIPAR policy engagement meeting

are feared to face the highest risk of COVID-19 outbreaks. The Ministry of Health (MoH) has established strategies for tackling the challenges that come with the COVID-19 crisis such as instructions to stay at home if not going out for essential movements and to adhere to social distancing rules. Although much of this information is communicated on digital platforms, seemingly based on the assumption that communities are already digitally-oriented and digitally-resourced, the 2018 ICT Survey by ZICTA indicates that only 20 percent of the population have access to the internet while only 37 percent of households across the country own a working TV with 40 percent owning a functional radio. Mobile phone coverage across the country is relatively high yet households have limited internet coverage. These factors adversely affect the ability of communities to access more complex information, therefore, digital assumption should be carefully reconsidered.

Beyond poor digital service access, most communities experience very basic problems

such as low access to water and sanitation, electric energy, modern digital amenities and so on. With a staggering 80 percent of the population residing in low cost residential areas that have characteristics of informal settlements with no decent urban planning, the 2015 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey approximates that 20 percent and 18 percent of households use communal toilets and public taps respectively while most of the households share limited room in living spaces, making it nearly impossible to avoid social interactions altogether even when stay-at-home instructions are well-received. Open markets pose an additional challenge as 15 percent of the traders have no fixed business location, making them highly mobile and increasing the risk of infection. Furthermore, the 2018 Labour Force Survey suggests that 40 percent of Zambian workers are self-employed based on community level activities that support livelihoods in low income neighbourhoods based on daily wage earnings that inherently require social interactions.

Government needs help, and CSOs collaboration through their community networks and resources can aid, particularly in disseminating information about the COVID-19 safety guidelines, generating the vital social learning and adaptations to improve the packaging and dissemination of information thus, supplementing the government response efforts. Information and resources being provided by both MoH should be cognizant of the various socioeconomic contradictions faced by communities, and CSOs, having built superior grassroots competences, can offer their services to complement the efforts of MoH. Therefore, a remarkable opportunity exists for CSOs to join the COVID-19 fight in a meaningful way or to accelerate their involvement.

Among other things, CSOs can invest in deliberately identifying core gaps that have already been identified by well-meaning government response strategies such limited digital coverage. CSOs grassroots social mobilization can enhance the limited coverage as well as use their networking competences which make them a formidable potential partner to the battle against COVID-19. Granted, CSOs will need basic public health training to ensure that they are self-protected and also protect others from infection as they go about rendering their services. However, all these potentials for collaboration will remain latent unless CSOs can quickly rise to the occasion and partner with the government.



# Inequality beyond Income and Averages



By Miselo Bwalya



The year 2020 begins against the backdrop of a particularly tough 2019 in which a myriad of economic challenges were faced. These challenges ranged from the huge public debt burden that led to difficulties in financing various Government programmes to the adverse impact of climatic conditions which led to electricity shortages and food insecurity. The beginning of 2020 also marks the end of a decade that saw Government embark on several programmes, including three national development plans and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) among other initiatives aimed at reducing poverty and developmental inequalities.

Despite the challenges faced at the close of the decade, the Human Development Report launched in December 2019 shows that Zambia has made marginal progress in terms of human development. The Human Development Index (HDI) which is used to measure progress showed that Zambia's HDI score moved from 0.589 in 2017 to 0.591 in 2018, representing a marginal improvement of 0.3 percent. The HDI ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of one being the highest and zero being the lowest. The HDI measures a country's relative standing in terms of health, education and living standards captured using Gross National Income (GNI).

Though these gains appear small, they indicate that there have been some improvements in the human development indicators over the last decade. In health, the improvements in the index imply that Zambians are now living longer. Compared to 2010, Zambia's life expectancy has improved from 56 years to 63 years in 2019. Improvements in education imply Zambians are spending slightly more years in school. Compared to 2010, the average number of years of schooling a Zambian adult received throughout their lifetime had increased from approximately six and half years to seven years. The number of years a 2-year-old child can expect to spend in school, based

on the current school enrolment rates has also increased by one year, from 11 years in 2010 to over 12 years. Additionally, the HDI score also implies that incomes have improved due to growth in the national income, meaning that since 2010, there are more resources available to be shared across the population.

However, the HDI score like many traditional measures of progress does not reflect the actual distribution of resources within the country. Monitoring the distribution of resources is critical in evaluating the performance of national programmes aimed at delivering inclusive development. For example, while the HDI shows that Zambia has not lost human development gains despite harsh economic times, the 2015 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey shows that 52 percent of Zambia's total income is held by only 10 percent of households leaving the remaining 90 percent of the households to share less than half of the income. This implies that despite the growth in national

income reflected by the increase in GNI over the last decade, this income is still controlled by the minority of the population. In this regard, there has been global consensus for the need to measure development outcomes beyond averages and income, and instead employ multi-dimensional measures of poverty which tend to be broader.

To remedy concerns over the failure of the HDI to demonstrate the equitable distribution of resources, the UNDP has since introduced an inequality adjusted HDI (IHDI) which takes into account the unequal distribution of resources and this is done by adjusting each dimension's average according to its level of inequality. Using the IHDI, Zambia's 2018 score drops from 0.591 to 0.394, this reduction represents a 33.4 percent loss in human development due to inequality.

Applying the same criteria to Zambia's 2010 HDI score of 0.531 you obtain an IHDI score of 0.364 representing a loss of 31.4 percent. The margin of loss in human development throughout the decade has remained relatively the same implying that very little has been achieved in reducing the levels of inequality. More worryingly, this also implies that the many national programmes implemented throughout the decade have had minimal impact on reducing inequality.

The close of the decade also means that Zambia has less than two years left to complete the implementation of the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP), a plan that committed to leaving no one behind when it was launched in 2017. However, the persistent levels of inequality cast doubt on whether the 7NDP will be able to achieve one of its major goals which is to reduce

poverty and vulnerability.

The Human Development Report's IHDI score provides key lessons that we must pick up on. The report shows that inequality continues to rise and is a major threat to Zambia achieving its development goals. The findings of the Human Development Report further entail that Zambia must move away from focusing on measures of progress that only reflect averages and do not take into account the distribution of resources. We also learn from the report that progress must not only be measured using traditional indicators such as GDP, GNI or inflation among others because they do not fully reflect inclusivity. Going forward, Government must instead adopt the use of multi-dimensional measures of development such as the IHDI in the routine evaluation of the performance of its interventions.

## NEW STAFF



**Malita Ng'andu Kabukaku**  
IT and Systems Administrator


Malita joined ZIPAR in May 2020. Malita holds an Honors Degree in Computing from the University of Greenwich and a Master of Art in Economic Policy Management from the University of Zambia. She is currently training in Data Science. She started practicing Information Technology in June 2008 at the University of Zambia where she worked as an IT Administrator under the Department of Economics. She also worked for Zambian Open University as an IT Engineer where she coordinated e-learning. She brings to ZIPAR her extensive skills and experience in Information and Communications Technology.



**Alex Chalwe Matowe**  
Driver

Alex joined ZIPAR as a driver in December 2019. He holds a certificate in Accountancy -ZICA Technician, Class CE Driver's Licence and a Defensive Driving Certificate -BELSAM. He has worked with various organisations as a driver as well as Sales Representative in others. The organisations include Bayport Financial Services, Stefanutti Stocks, Varun Food (z), JVC civils -Mopani Mining and CHEKOLM Industries.

# Brexit: What then for Zambia-UK Trade?



*Shimukunku Manchishi*



*Mwanda Phiri*

3 1st January, 2020 was dubbed Brexit day – the day that officially marked the United Kingdom’s long-awaited withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Brexit, an abbreviation for ‘British exit’ from the EU, has dominated global affairs over the last four years. This is on the back of a monumental decision made in the United Kingdom (UK) on 23rd June 2016 that saw nearly 52% of 30 million plus Britons, vote to leave the EU in a referendum. Although the motivation for Brexit remains a debatable subject, a poll conducted by the Centre for Social Investigation in 2018 revealed two primary reasons for the majority vote to leave the EU; immigration concerns and a quest for sovereignty.

Initially, the UK had been due to leave the EU on 29th March, 2019 subject to reaching a withdrawal agreement with the EU. But, in what has been a trail of twists and turns, and a couple of extensions, Brexit was finally extended to 31st January, 2020 and the UK has now left the EU with a deal. As Brexit negotiations

unfolded, questions regarding the likely impact of Brexit on trade relations between the UK and the rest of the world including least developed countries (LDCs) such as Zambia, started to emerge. And for good reason. Thus far, Zambia’s trade with the UK has been determined collectively under the framework of the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) trade agreement which offers duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market for LDCs. The EBAs however are not perfect and are known for having stringent rules of origin which deter trade. Notably, as the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, so too ceases its participation in the EBA.

From the beginning, there have been two possible Brexit scenarios; a ‘deal’ and a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. Under a ‘deal’ scenario, the UK remains a part of the EU customs union and during a transitional period presumed to now be 11 months, continues to trade with non-EU countries under the EU trade frameworks while negotiating a new partnership agreement with the EU. For Zambian firms exporting to the UK, this means that trade would continue as usual, at least for the duration of the transition period. Following which, trade between Zambia and the UK will have to be under World Trade Organisation (WTO) Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rules, or new UK unilateral trade agreements with LDCs. On the other hand, a ‘no-deal’ Brexit would have entailed the UK’s instantaneous exit from the EU, its customs union as well as the single market. Zambia’s trade with the UK would have reverted to WTO MFN rules immediately, unless the UK offered preferential market access to LDCs similar to the EBA prior to its exit. Ultimately, both scenarios would have led to the same trade outcome for LDCs, but a no-deal scenario would have expedited this.



But how significant is Zambia's trade with the UK anyway? Is there a basis for concern or is Brexit really much ado about nothing for Zambia-UK trade relations? Trade data reveals that as a single trade partner, the UK is not significant, accounting for a mere 2.4% of Zambia's total exports over the period 2014 to 2018. At face value, it appears as though Brexit is of no concern. However, when we further decompose what is being exported, Zambia's top 10 exports to the UK reveals among others, unused postage stamps, unrefined copper, refined copper, and other key products such as fresh or chilled vegetables, fresh cut roses and buds, peas and natural honey. Moreover, in the EU trading bloc, the UK emerges as the most important export destination for Zambia. Notwithstanding the

small share of exports to the UK, the UK remains a critical market destination for niche products such as honey, cut flowers, peas, etc. which are relatively labour intensive and can bolster Zambia's export diversification drive, employment creation and forex earnings.

Developments around Brexit are consequently of concern but mostly regarding exports since imports from the UK do not receive preferential market access and thus are not likely to be impacted. Then again, neither are exports. So far, all indications are that the UK Government has replicated existing trade agreements with LDCs. According to the UK Government, the UK will continue to provide duty-free and quota-free market access to developing countries such

as Zambia under a replica agreement of the EU-EBA. This implies that Brexit is not likely to negatively impact Zambia's exports to the UK in any significant way. Trade adjustment costs, if any, will be minimal and mainly as a result of information asymmetry and uncertainty on how trade will continue post-Brexit.

In concluding, Zambia's trade with the UK is likely to remain the same under a similar version of the EBA post-Brexit. And as the UK offers a replica EBA, Zambia should seize this opportunity to engage the UK on developing more flexible rules of origin. This will make exports to the UK easier for businesses particularly MSMEs and help the country maximise this trade relationship.



## Claudia Mvula Pollen, Visiting Research Fellow

Claudia is a Visiting Researcher from the Department of Development Studies, University of Zambia. She is a PhD graduate from the University of Leeds, United Kingdom, in the core area of International Development.

She is passionate about critically exploring the narrative of trade in development as well as sustainable development. From 2010, she has served as a lecturer and researcher at the University of Zambia in the Development Studies Department. She also serves as a part-time lecturer at the University of Lusaka teaching and navigating different nuances of Development Management. During her PhD studies, she was engaged in focused research, questioning gendered power relations in value chains and prospects for integration in global markets and eventual contribution to the

improvement of wellbeing for the different actors, particularly vulnerable women. From 2018, she was engaged as a consultant by Oxfam International on a research project with field work in Mozambique and Zambia, aimed at questioning the tension, coherence and status of the Low carbon –High carbon development narratives in energy and agriculture. In 2019, she was certified by the Swedish Board of Trade, in the Trade Academy. She sits on the Zambia National Technical Committee on International Trade and Standards.

# ZIPAR and IAPRI study Economic Implications of Climate Change in Zambia



*ZIPAR and IAPRI staff in a group photo with stakeholders from Government during the Implications of Climate Change on the Economy in Zambia Inception meeting held 4th February 2020, Sarovar Premiere Hotel, Lusaka.*

**Z**IPAR and the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI) jointly carried out a study on economic implications of climate change in Zambia. The study seeks to understand the potential impacts of different climate change channels on economic growth in Zambia; and assess the implications of these impacts for climate adaptation policy in the country.

This study which commenced in December 2019 to June 2020 analysed the economic implications of climate change in Zambia focusing on energy using the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (DCGE) model. It is funded by IFPRI. The study built upon an integrated chain of analytical efforts, already applied to eight African countries designed specifically to inform key strategic decisions. Currently, IFPRI is actively engaged in a regional programme in

Southern Africa, labelled Towards Inclusive Economic Development in Southern Africa. A key component within this programme is climate change, its impact on Southern Africa and the identification of potential adaptation measures that countries in the region can take.

In February 2020, ZIPAR and IAPRI jointly hosted an inception meeting with key stakeholders from key Government Ministries and Agencies. A joint dissemination meeting was scheduled later in the year.

# A DATE WITH PARLIAMENT

In the period January to June 2020, ZIPAR made nine presentations to Parliament on various policy matters. The presentations are listed below and full papers can be found at [www.zipar.org.zm](http://www.zipar.org.zm)

<i>Title of Presentation</i>	<i>Committee Name</i>	<i>Date of Presentation</i>
An Assessment of the Implementation of the Youth Development Fund	Committee on Youth, Sport and Child Matters	14 <sup>th</sup> January 2020
The Budget Implementation vis-à-vis Decent Employment Creation in Zambia	Budget Committee	14 <sup>th</sup> January 2020
The Petroleum Industry in Zambia: Challenges and Opportunities	Committee on National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters	30 <sup>th</sup> January 2020
ZIPAR's comments on the findings and recommendations of the report by the Auditor General on Social Cash Transfer in Zambia 2014 to 2017	Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Services	27 <sup>th</sup> January 2020
A Review of the National Planning and Budgeting Bill of 2019	A Joint Committee on the National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters and the Budget	28 January 2020
The State of Fiscal Decentralisation in Zambia	Committee on Local Government Accounts	3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2020
The Assessment on the Operational and Financial Performance of TAZARA	Committee on Parastatal Bodies	17 <sup>th</sup> March 2020
Ramifications of the Patents and Companies Registration Agency Bill, N.A.B No.3 of 2020	Committee on National Economy, Trade and Labour Matters	1 <sup>st</sup> June 2020
Budget Performance for the first quarter of 2020: In the Midst of COVID-19	Budget Committee	15 <sup>th</sup> June 2020

In the same period four ZIPAR submissions were adopted by Parliament and formed part of the Committees' reports to the 4<sup>th</sup> session of the 12<sup>th</sup> National Assembly as shown below:

<b>Title of Submission</b>	<b>Name of Committee</b>	<b>Date of submission</b>	<b>Date of Adoption</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>
Memorandum to Parliament on ZIPAR's comments on the findings and recommendations of the report by the Auditor General on Social Cash Transfer in Zambia 2014 to 2017	Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Services	27 <sup>th</sup> January 2020	3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2020	ZIPAR's recommendations formed part of the Committee's report to the 4 <sup>th</sup> session of the 12 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly laid on the Table of the House on 27 <sup>th</sup> February 2020 and was adopted on 3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2020
Memorandum to Parliament on the Budget Implementation Vis-à-vis Decent Employment Creation in Zambia	The Budget Committee	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2019	20 <sup>th</sup> June 2020	ZIPAR's recommendations formed part of the Committee's report to the 4 <sup>th</sup> session of the 12 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly laid on the Table of the House on 19 <sup>th</sup> June 2020 and was adopted on 20 <sup>th</sup> June 2020
Memorandum to Parliament on the Assessment of the Implementation of the Youth Development Fund	Committee on Youth, Sport and Child Matters	27 <sup>th</sup> November 2019	26 <sup>th</sup> June 2020	ZIPAR's recommendations formed part of the Committee's report to the 4 <sup>th</sup> session of the 12 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly laid on the Table of the House on 19 <sup>th</sup> June 2020 and was adopted on 26 <sup>th</sup> June 2020
Memorandum to Parliament on the Petroleum Industry in Zambia: Challenges and Opportunities	Committee on Energy, Water Development and Tourism	Oct 2019	9 <sup>th</sup> July 2020	ZIPAR's recommendations formed part of the Committee's report to the 4 <sup>th</sup> session of the 12 <sup>th</sup> National Assembly laid on the Table of the House on 19 <sup>th</sup> June 2020 and was adopted on 9 <sup>th</sup> July 2020



# ZIPAR hosts interns under Youth Lead programme

ZIPAR is hosting three interns under the YouthLead programme founded by USAID. YouthLead.org is the platform for young change makers which provides youth with opportunities to connect with like-minded networks of young people, mentors, resources and events. While focused on youth from the Global South, the platform is available globally. The trio namely Elijah Mumba, Kasonde Chituta and Bonaventure Kanyanta were scheduled to be at ZIPAR from February to August 2020. They were being mentored and supervised by the Emerging Themes, Macroeconomics and Human Development Units.

## Elijah Mumba



“While in University, ZIPAR’s work caught my eye, gleaming desirably on the television and newspapers, piquing my interest. Therefore, I would describe my internship experience with ZIPAR as both positive and a dream come true. So far, the five months I have spent at ZIPAR have allowed me to grow personally, gain new skills in economics and research- experience that I did not previously have. I have also gained a better understanding of human development, made a new network, and gained a few new references for the future. Besides, I have gained a new sense of professionalism and a clearer view of what it means to be a researcher.

Overall, I am grateful to everyone at ZIPAR for their unyielding kindness and willingness to teach a relatively recent graduate during a very stressful time in the country as transmission of COVID-19 continues to be widespread. I am thankful especially to Nakubyana Mungomba’s step by step guidance during my master’s degree scholarship application process, and my supervisor Miselo Bwalya for treating me as an equal in the department, and for giving me the tools I will need to be successful in the next steps of my school and my career.

Cheers to the best internship!”

## Kasonde Chituta




“As a result of my interest in climate change, my internship at ZIPAR has been an impeccable fit. I have had the privilege to deepen my knowledge on emerging themes, how they affect the Zambian economy and bridge the gap between my classroom knowledge and evidence-based research. Working under the mentorship of Dr. Bernard Tembo and Mulima Nyambe Mubanga in the Emerging Themes Unit, I have learnt new skills such as data analysis using R, developing research proposals and valuable report writing skills. I have also learnt a lot during my internship from interaction with colleagues and other ZIPAR members of staff. One of my favourite things at ZIPAR is the strong connections which are held with the Government, which therefore, make evidence-based research and analysis so effective”.


## Bonaventure Kanyanta



“Having been on internship at ZIPAR for over five months now, I have come to realize and cherish just how healthy and welcoming the environment has been set out and this inspired me to look forward to reporting for work every day. I have learnt more than I ever expected. I felt in the beginning that I would really have a head start being that I have done a thesis dissertation before but oh was I wrong! In the first week, I realized that research and policy analysis is a different ball game and this greatly helped me settle in and change my mind-set because I could only learn if I was humble enough to admit I did not know everything.

I feel that my supervisor Nakubyana Mungomba and all the researchers in the Macroeconomic Unit have done a wonderful job teaching and guiding me about research and policy analysis. They have constantly involved me in projects, and that has really been beneficial as I haven’t just been learning theory but also the real world practical side of evidence-based research and policy analysis. I also appreciate that throughout this internship, my input has been valued. Looking back, I am very much appreciative of the platform I have been given so far”.

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